From: ASSEMBLY MEMBER DERN

Subject: MURDER AND EXTREMISM IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2022

Attached is the Anti-Defamation League Center on Extremism’s Report on Murder and Extremism in the United States, dated February 2023 for your information and review.

Prepared by: Assembly Counsel’s Office
Respectfully submitted: Robin Dern, Assembly Member
District 2, Eagle River/Chugiak
Murder & Extremism in the United States in 2022
Including an In-Depth Analysis of Extremist Mass Killings
About the Center on Extremism

The ADL Center on Extremism is the foremost authority on extremism, terrorism and hate, both foreign and domestic. We monitor extremism across the ideological spectrum. Our staff of investigators, analysts, researchers and technical experts strategically monitors, exposes and disrupts extremist threats — on the internet and on the ground. We provide resources, expertise and educational briefings that enable law enforcement officers, public officials and community leaders, as well as internet and technology companies to identify and counter emerging threats. Learn more about COE’s work and the latest in the fight against extremism by visiting adl.org/coe.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Murder & Extremism in the United States in 2022

KEY FINDINGS:

- Every year, individuals with ties to different extreme causes and movements kill people in the United States; the ADL Center on Extremism (COE) tracks these murders. Extremists regularly commit murders in the service of their ideology, in the service of a group or gang they may belong to, or even while engaging in traditional, non-ideological criminal activities.

- In 2022, domestic extremists killed at least 25 people in the U.S., in 12 separate incidents. This represents a decrease from the 33 extremist-related murders documented in 2021 and is comparable to the 22 extremist-related murders in 2020. It continues the recent trend of fewer extremist-related killings after a five year span of 47-78 extremist-related murders per year (2015-2019).

- The 2022 murder totals would have been much lower if not for two high-casualty extremist-related shooting sprees. Only 10 of the 25 deaths occurred outside of those sprees—and one of those 10 deaths occurred in a less lethal mass shooting attempt.

- The issue of extremist-related mass killings is of growing concern and is the subject of a special section of this report. From the 1970s through the 2000s, domestic extremist-related mass killings were relatively uncommon. However, over the past 12 years, their number has greatly increased. Most of these mass killings were committed by right-wing extremists, but left-wing and domestic Islamist extremists were also responsible for incidents. The Center on Extremism has identified 62 extremist-connected mass killing incidents since 1970, with 46 of them being ideologically motivated. Disturbingly, more than half (26, or 57%) of the ideological mass killings have occurred within the past 12 years. Of particular concern in recent years are shootings inspired by white supremacist “accelerationist” propaganda urging such attacks.

- In 2022, 18 of the 25 extremist-related murders appear to have been committed in whole or part for ideological motives, while the remaining seven murders either have no clear motive or were committed for a non-ideological motive.

- All the extremist-related murders in 2022 were committed by right-wing extremists of various kinds, who typically commit most such killings each year but only occasionally are responsible for all (the last time this occurred was 2012). Left-wing extremists engage in violence ranging from assaults to fire-bombings and arsons, but since the late 1980s have not often targeted people with deadly violence. The same cannot be said for domestic Islamist extremists, but deadly incidents linked to Islamist extremism have decreased significantly in the U.S. over the past five years.

- White supremacists commit the greatest number of domestic extremist-related murders in most years, but in 2022 the percentage was unusually high: 21 of the 25 murders were linked to white supremacists. Again, this is primarily due to mass shootings. Only one of the murders was committed by a right-wing anti-government extremist—the lowest number since 2017.
Each year, individuals with ties to extreme movements and ideologies kill people in the United States. Some killings are high profile and spark nationwide outrage; others may go largely unnoticed except by families and friends of victims. Since 2008, the ADL Center on Extremism (COE) has worked to identify and track as many of these domestic extremist-related murders as possible, and to identify past extremist-related murders dating back to 1970.

Domestic extremists pose significant problems in the U.S., from incitement and harassment to hate crimes and terrorism, but reliable data can often be difficult to find and this can make it more difficult to understand or respond to issues related to extremism. Since 2015, COE has used its data on extremist-related murders to release annual reports on such killings to help people understand one of the most serious threats that extremists in the U.S. can pose: the taking of human life.

Domestic extremists—extremists who are U.S. citizens or longtime permanent residents—regularly commit murders to further their causes, using deadly force against perceived enemies. In addition, extremists also often commit murders in the service of a group or gang they may belong to—targeting a rival group member, for example, or even a suspected informant in their own ranks. Extremists can also commit murders while engaging in non-ideological criminal activities ranging from home invasions to domestic violence. In some cases, the motive for a particular murder connected to an extremist may never be discovered. We include all these types of killings in this report, as each is important for different reasons. The data we provide is transparent, so it is possible to distinguish ideologically motivated killings from other types.

Extremist murders in the U.S. in recent years have been committed by extremists from the far right, such as white supremacists or sovereign citizens, by domestic Islamist extremists, by left-wing extremists such as Black nationalists or anarchists and occasionally by people associated with other, more obscure causes or groups. All types are included in these annual reports if such killings occur. Each report also contains updated statistics from previous years, where applicable, as the extremist connections to some killings can take months or years to emerge. The discovery in April 2022 of possibly as many as 12 or more sets of human remains in Oklahoma buried on two sites, including property connected to a leader of the Universal Aryan Brotherhood, a large and violent white supremacist prison gang, graphically underscores this fact. At this point, it is not clear how many of the remains will be identified, how many of the killings will be solved or how many of them will be clearly linked to the UAB.1

It is important to note these statistics are just one metric of extremist violence and crime. Every year, extremists in the U.S. are involved in terrorist plots and acts, armed standoffs, shootouts with police, hate crimes, scams and cons, threats and harassment and a wide variety of other criminal acts. ADL’s regularly updated Hate, Extremism, Antisemitism and Terrorism (H.E.A.T.) map keeps track of some of the more serious of these extremist-related incidents, including murders but also terrorist incidents and shootouts, as well as other nonviolent indicators, such as white supremacist events and propaganda distribution incidents.2
Domestic extremists killed at least 25 people in the U.S. in 2022. This represents a substantial drop from the 33 deaths COE has recorded for 2021 and is comparable to the 22 people murdered by extremists in 2020. The past three years have all seen fewer people killed at the hands of extremists than the five preceding years (2015-2019), when deaths ranged from 47 to 78 each year.

Still, the deaths for 2022 could easily have been much lower, as 60% of the murders came from just two incidents—deadly shooting sprees in Buffalo, New York, and Colorado Springs, Colorado. Absent these mass killings, there would have been only 10 extremist-related deaths in 2022. Most extremist-related killing incidents involve only a single victim, but in recent years a small number of extremist mass killers have caused a disproportionate number of the deaths.
Almost all the killings in 2022 (93%) were committed with firearms. This has been a consistent fact of extremist violence for years. Although many people may think of extremists as employing weapons such as bombs and explosives, it is firearms—plentiful, accessible and often laxly-regulated in the U.S.—that are actually the deadly weapon of choice for American extremists. Indeed, in each of the past five years over 80% of the victims of deadly extremist violence were killed with firearms, a consequence of the country’s failure to take meaningful action to deal with gun violence.

Extremist-related killings are rare relative to the total homicides in the U.S. each year. However, extremist killings can have a disproportionate impact on communities, or even the entire country, especially when they take the form of a hate crime or a terrorist attack.³
The ADL Center on Extremism tracks domestic extremist-related murders connected to all types of extremism, including right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism and domestic Islamist extremism, as well as less common forms.

When, as sometimes happens, extremists adhere to or are influenced by more than one extremist movement, they are categorized here by their apparent “primary” ideology, i.e., the ideology that seems most important to them, is the most recently followed or, if applicable, that seems most directly related to the murders they committed. This is done not to obscure the presence of multiple belief systems but to make quantification more practical.

As in most years since the late 1980s, lethal extremist violence in 2022 was heavily dominated by right-wing extremism. In fact, every one of the 25 murders documented in this report had ties to forms of right-wing extremism, including white supremacy, anti-government extremism and right-wing conspiracy theorists.

Over the past decade, right-wing extremists have committed the majority of extremist-related killings in all years but one—2016, the year of the shooting spree at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida, by a person motivated by Islamist extremism. Of the 444 people killed at the hands of extremists over the past 10 years, 335 (or 75%) were killed by right-wing extremists.

**Domestic Extremist-Related Killings in the U.S. by Perpetrator Affiliation, 2022**

25 TOTAL DEATHS

All of the 2022 extremist-related murders were committed by right-wing extremists.

- White Supremacy: 84%
- Anti-Government Extremism: 4%
- QAnon Extremism: 4%
- Other Right-Wing Extremism: 8%

Note: Total deaths include both ideologically and non-ideologically motivated killings. Source: ADL
Right-wing extremists in the U.S. commit such a large proportion of murders for a range of reasons. It is not that only right-wing extremists are violent. Left-wing extremists engage in violence ranging from assaults to fire-bombings and arsons, but in recent decades have only occasionally targeted people with deadly violence, being far more likely to attack property. Domestic Islamist extremists in the U.S. have been more willing to engage in deadly violence—including shooting sprees—but such incidents have decreased significantly over the past five years, primarily due to the decline of the terrorist movement ISIS/ISIL, whose calls to violence inspired many plots and attacks.
Moreover, the far right in this country is large, comprising many movements, including multiple white supremacist and anti-government extremist movements as well as a variety of single-issue extremists and conspiracy-based movements. Most of these movements have some degree of association with violence, up to and including terrorist plots and attacks. Even the newest right-wing movements to emerge in recent years movements that include incels and other toxic masculinity extremists, QAnon adherents and anti-government boogalooers—quickly developed violent track records.5

Right-Wing Extremist-Related Killings in the U.S. by Perpetrator Affiliation, 2013-2022

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White Supremacy</td>
<td>73%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Government Extremism</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toxic Masculinity Extremism</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Abortion &amp; Other Right-Wing Extremism</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: 1. Anti-government extremism includes militia, sovereign citizens, tax protesters, boogalooers and other right-wing anti-government extremists.
2. Total deaths include both ideologically and non-ideologically motivated killings.

Source: ADL

Another reason why there are more killings connected to right-wing extremists is because some types of right-wing extremists often commit non-ideological violence as well as ideological violence. For the narrow purposes of this report, COE defines ideological murders as killings directed against perceived enemies, as well as other people, such as police or bystanders, who may get in the way of or try to stop such attacks. The Center on Extremism defines non-ideological murders as murders for which the motive is unclear, murders committed to benefit an extremist group or members thereof (such as killing internal or external rivals, or suspected informants) and murders committed for traditional motives such as greed, anger or jealousy. These can include domestic violence murders as well as murders related to criminal enterprises such as drug-dealing, in which many white supremacist gangs engage.

All these types of murders are conservatively classified in this report as “non-ideological,” even though it is possible that extremism still played at least some role in many. It is important to account for such killings, as to do otherwise would offer a misleadingly small sense of the dangers that extremists pose—after all, a murder is a murder. Moreover, there is considerable public interest in some of these subjects—such as the link between extremism and domestic violence.6

Over the past decade, ideological and non-ideological killings by extremists have been roughly equivalent (240 to 204), with most of the latter coming at the hands of right-wing extremists, especially white supremacists. Anti-government sovereign citizens have also been responsible for numerous non-ideological killings in recent years. This is partly because, since the late 1990s, sovereign citizen ideology has increasingly spread within the nation’s jails and prisons.
It is worth noting that the statistics in this report may undercount the number of non-ideological killings by other types of extremists, simply because their extremist ties may be less likely to be exposed in the investigation or news coverage of a non-ideological killing. In contrast, a white supremacist who commits a non-ideological killing may still possibly be identified as such by his or her tattoos, or perhaps a gang association previously documented by law enforcement or corrections officials. Similarly, a sovereign citizen arrested for a murder is likely to use the distinctive pseudo-legal language and tactics of that movement and attract media attention in doing so.

In 2022, 18 of the 25 extremist-related murders appear to have been committed in whole or part for ideological motives, while the remaining seven murders either have no clear motive or were committed for a non-ideological motive.
Right-wing extremists commit most extremist-related murders each year, but in 2022 such extremists committed all the murders COE has been able to document. The last year this was the case was 2012. White supremacists committed 21 of the 25 killings (84%), including five committed by members or associates of white supremacist prison gangs such as the Universal Aryan Brotherhood, the United Aryan Brotherhood or the Nazi Low Riders.7

The two most serious incidents were deadly shooting sprees: the attack on Club Q, an LGBTQ+ bar in Colorado Springs in November 2022 and the attack on the Tops supermarket in Buffalo in May 2022.

The Center on Extremism only included the attack on Club Q in this report after lengthy deliberation. The alleged attacker, Anderson Lee Aldrich, killed five people in the shooting and wounded 17 more. Aldrich has been charged with 10 counts of first-degree murder, 86 counts of attempted first-degree murder, 90 counts of assault and 48 counts of bias-motivated crime, although authorities have so far declined to discuss what evidence they have of motivation. A friend and neighbor of Aldrich has claimed Aldrich made racist and homophobic statements in his presence. However, these facts alone are not sufficient to determine either extremism or white supremacy.8

However, in December 2022, NBC News revealed there were two web addresses allegedly connected to Aldrich. One address was apparently intended to be for a website called “RealTube,” although there was no actual site at that address—merely a file directory with several very short videos that appear to have been failed attempts by Aldrich to record or livestream his attack. The second address was for a site that, according to the friend, Aldrich created, a bare-bones 4chan look-alike site called FreeSpeechTube. Only a few people ever posted to the site in its short existence, leaving a handful of mostly racist and antisemitic posts. Because the posts are anonymous, it is not possible at this point to attribute any of them to Aldrich. However, the site also displayed on its front page what it described as a “showcase” item, something that could only have been placed on the site by its administrator.9

The “showcase” item is a video, six minutes and 23 seconds long, created by a 19-year-old British white supremacist, Daniel Harris, who was recently sentenced in Great Britain to over 11 years in prison for his terrorism-promoting propaganda. Titled “Wrong Target,” the video is a work of accelerationist white supremacist propaganda designed to encourage people to engage in violent attacks, its narrator arguing that “anything other than mass eradication is a waste of time.” Accelerationism is a white supremacist concept arguing for the use of extreme violence to destroy societal structures so that a white ethno-state can be built from their ashes. The racist and antisemitic video claims that there may be hard targets and soft targets, but “all targets are good targets.” It explicitly references, through imagery or narration, right-wing mass killers such as Brenton Tarrant, Anders Behring Breivik.
and Patrick Crusius, and claims that both high-level and low-level targets are “valid,” because “the swarms of subhumans will not remove themselves.” The video also shows part of the livestreamed 2019 attempted shooting attack on a synagogue in Halle, Germany, by white supremacist Stephan Balliet.10

It is the prominent presence of the “Wrong Target” video on a site attributed to Aldrich and in a location that seemingly only the site administrator would have access to, that was the dominant factor in categorizing the Club Q attack an extremist attack, because few people who are not sympathetic to such extreme ideas would try to spread them. Moreover, the video, combined with the short videos on the other site, provides circumstantial—though not conclusive—evidence that Aldrich may have been trying to emulate previous accelerationist white supremacist shooters who livestreamed or attempted to livestream their attacks. As Aldrich’s case moves through the judicial process, additional information could be revealed that can clarify or confirm the nature of the attack and its motive.

The motive behind the other white supremacist mass shooting attack of 2022 is abundantly clear, because the killer, Payton Gendron, composed a manifesto. On May 14, 2022, the 18-year-old Gendron drove to Buffalo, New York, where he opened fire at a Tops Friendly Market, specifically targeting Black people (11 of his 13 victims, including all 10 fatalities, were Black). Gendron deliberately aped previous accelerationist white supremacist killers such as Patrick Crusius and, especially, Brenton Tarrant.
Like Tarrant, he decorated his weapons with names, slogans and symbols, including references to white supremacist and racist killers. Like Tarrant, he attempted to livestream his shooting spree. And like Tarrant, he created a manifesto intended to justify his attack and provide guidance and encouragement for would-be white supremacist killers who might follow in his footsteps. In the document, he listed purported reasons for his attack, including “most of all,” his desire to spread “awareness” to his “fellow Whites” and to “encourage further attacks that will eventually start the war that will save the Western world, save the White race and allow for humanity to progress into more advanced civilizations.”

Though smaller in scale, there were other hate-related white supremacist killings in 2022 as well, including the alleged hate crime murder of a Black man at a gas station in Tracy, California, in May 2022, by Jeremy Wayne Jones and Christina Lyn Garrier. Jones has multiple white supremacist tattoos, including the phrase “white pride” as well as an “88,” which is a white supremacist numeric code for “Heil Hitler.” In October 2022 in Wisconsin, Joshua Scolman, a white supremacist inmate with alleged ties to the Wisconsin Aryan Brotherhood and who had previously written about his violent fantasies, including killing Black people, fatally stabbed a Black inmate and attempted to stab another.

Only a handful of the 2022 extremist-related murders did not involve white supremacists. These included a QAnon adherent in Michigan who killed his wife, then died in a subsequent shootout with police; an anti-government sovereign citizen in New York who allegedly stabbed to death a man who tried to intervene in an argument between the sovereign and relatives; and a convicted Capitol storming defendant who reportedly killed a woman by crashing into her car in what was described by authorities as a suicide attempt to avoid serving years in prison (see Incidents section, below, for details on these killings).

However, the most serious of the non-white supremacist killings took place in Portland, Oregon, in February 2022, where Benjamin Jeffrey Smith allegedly opened fire on a group of left-wing activists gathering outside his home to go to a protest at a nearby park. He shot six people, killing one, before one of the activists was able to disable him with return fire. Smith’s online footprint revealed extreme hostility towards leftists and “communists,” whom he claimed weren’t human beings. In one post he declared that “extreme violence” is the “only thing they give any attention to,” while in another he asserted that “the only way to win a civil war, and we are in a civil war, is to be the most violent.” Smith also made racist, antisemitic and misogynistic postings.
Finally, it is worth noting one type of extremist-related killing that did not occur in 2022: no police officers or corrections officers were killed by extremists this past year. This is the first year since 2011 that no such murders occurred. Since 1990, there have only been three years in which extremists did not kill at least one police officer or corrections official.

### Police Officers Killed in the United States by Domestic Extremists (1971-2022)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>By Left-Wing Extremists*</th>
<th>By Right-Wing Extremists</th>
<th>By Domestic Islamist Extremists</th>
<th>By Other Extremists</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1971-1980</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981-1990</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-2000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2010</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011-2020</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2021-2030**</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>41</strong></td>
<td><strong>62</strong></td>
<td><strong>3</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>107</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes anarchists, Black nationalists.  ** Partial Data

Source: ADL
The shooting sprees in Buffalo and Colorado Springs, as well as the attempted mass shooting in Portland, highlight one of the largest threats that extremists pose to public safety today: mass killing incidents. The number of such incidents related to extremists has skyrocketed in recent years and there is no reason to think this will change soon.

There is no consensus as to what constitutes a “mass killing;” different studies and reports use different standards. One of the most common measures defines mass killings as events that leave four or more people dead. This is the standard COE has used in the past. However, by itself, such a measurement understates the full threat of mass killings posed by extremists, because there have been a number of incidents in which extremists intended to kill many people but succeeded in killing fewer than four. In 2019, for example, white supremacist John Earnest opened fire inside a synagogue in Poway, California, attempting a mass killing of Jews attending services there. He killed one person and wounded several others, but then his firearm jammed, and he fled. In other words, some violent episodes would have been mass killings if not for luck or other circumstances, such as the timely intervention of law enforcement. Thus attempted mass killings are also important to acknowledge.14

How many extremist-related mass killings and lethal attempted mass killings have taken place in the U.S.? Center on Extremism data on extremist-related murders have identified a minimum of 62 such incidents from the 1970s to the present day. However, 16 of those 62 events either were not ideological in nature, or the motive for them could not be determined. These included school shootings, domestic violence shootings and workplace shootings conducted by extremists but not necessarily because of their extremist ideology. Although we note those incidents here, we do not further analyze them or include them in the statistics below.

The 46 remaining incidents, however, represent direct ideological attacks that resulted in mass deaths (31) or were lethal incidents that were intended to cause mass deaths (15). Such attacks have killed at least 420 people between 1971 and 2022.

There are three other types of incidents related to extremist mass killings that are not tabulated or analyzed in this study. First, there have been some incidents in which people may have attempted a mass killing but failed to cause fatalities. For example, in an act of left-wing political violence, James Hodgkinson opened fire in 2017 at a group of Republican members of Congress practicing in Arlington, Virginia, for the yearly congressional baseball game. The shooter wounded several people in the attack, but none fatally. Similarly, in 2020, a self-described “incel,” Armando Hernandez, shot at couples at a Phoenix-area mall, angry that women had rejected him. He injured several people, but they all survived. Because this report focuses on extremist-related murders and because COE does not necessarily have comprehensive data on all shootings by all types of extremists over this time span, these incidents are not included in the statistics here, but their existence further emphasizes the serious threat posed by extremist mass killings.15

Second, extremists have sometimes plotted mass killings, or at least considered mass killings as an option among various possible types of terrorist attacks, only to be detained by law enforcement before carrying out such plans. For example, in 2022, FBI agents arrested two men in Warsaw, Missouri, on charges related to an alleged plot to travel to the Texas border to shoot migrants crossing the border. Numerous people might have been killed had the pair...
been able to carry out their purported plans, but they were not given the opportunity. Such incidents are not included in these tabulations because they did not result in any deaths and because it is not always possible to gauge whether such an attack would actually have taken place. Again, the existence of such plots underlines the overall danger of extremist mass killings.\textsuperscript{16}

Finally, there are numerous incidents where extremists have opened fire on law enforcement officers trying to arrest them, to serve a search warrant or engaging in a similar activity. Some of these violent responses have resulted in significant injuries and deaths among law enforcement. However, such reactive incidents are not included here; rather, the focus is on extremists seeking to commit a mass killing.

When one looks at the historical data, the recent surge of extremist-related mass killings is immediately obvious. From the 1970s through the 2000s, extremist mass killing incidents consistently occurred at a relatively low level—from two to seven incidents a decade (although, it should be noted that, because of the difficulty in determining which left-wing extremist bomb attacks in the 1970s and 1980s were intended to cause mass casualties—many were actually aimed at property and warnings were telephoned to targets beforehand—it is possible that the number of such incidents may be undercounted here).

\textbf{Domestic Extremist Mass Killing Incidents in the United States by Decade}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{mass_killing_incidents_by_decade.png}
\caption{Mass killing incidents by decade.}
\end{figure}

However, in the 2010s the number of mass killing incidents rose precipitously to 21, at least three times the total from any previous decade. In 2021 and 2022 there have already been five incidents, as many as there were during the whole decade of 2001-2010. The 26 mass killing incidents over the past 12 years actually exceed those from the previous 40 years (20). It is not an exaggeration to say that we live in an age of extremist mass killings.

Just as the number of incidents has increased, so too has the number of deaths. Between 2010 and 2020, 164 people died in ideological extremist-related mass killing incidents, far more than in any other decade other than the 1990s—almost all the deaths during which were caused by a single horrific incident, the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing. The past two years, 2021 and 2022, have added 22 more casualties to the deadly toll.
What has this recent surge of mass killings looked like? From 2011 through 2022, a period of 12 years, there were 26 ideological domestic extremist-related mass killing incidents (18 actual mass killings and 8 lethal attempted mass killings). These attacks resulted in 186 deaths—and many others wounded or injured (the latter often as they attempted to flee the scene of a mass killing).

Overwhelmingly, these recent mass killing events were also mass shooting events. Firearms were the primary weapon of choice in 23 of the 26 incidents; the only exceptions were the Boston Marathon bombing of 2013 and the vehicular attacks conducted in 2017 by white supremacist James Fields, Jr., in Charlottesville, Virginia, and Islamist extremist Sayfullo Saipov in New York City. Of the 186 deaths, 174 of them (including one of the people killed by the Boston Marathon bombers) were by firearms. Firearms are by far the weapon of choice for domestic terrorists in the U.S. seeking to kill.

During the past 12 years, right-wing extremists, domestic Islamist extremists and left-wing extremists have all conducted or attempted mass killing incidents. Right-wing extremists, of different stripes, have launched the most attacks, totaling 16 of the 26 incidents (61.5%) and 89 of the 186 deaths (47.8%). The majority of the attacks by right-wing extremists (10 out of 16) were committed by white supremacists, typically targeting minorities. They killed 71 people. Anti-government extremists, anti-abortion extremists, toxic masculinity extremists and other right-wing extremists also engaged in mass killing incidents.

Domestic Islamist extremists engaged in six mass killing incidents (23%), resulting in 81 deaths (43.5%), including the single most lethal incident, the Pulse nightclub shooting in Orlando, Florida, in 2016, which killed 49 people. Left-wing extremists—all Black nationalist extremists—launched three attacks (11.5%) that killed 12 people (6%). Finally, categorized as “other extremism” in these tabulations, is the 2019 Jersey City, New Jersey, shooting spree by Black Hebrew Israelites David Anderson and Francine Graham, which primarily targeted a Jewish kosher market. They killed four people.
Some of the reasons for the alarming increase in extremist mass killings are clear. Attacks by right-wing extremists were driven primarily by white supremacist attacks against racial and religious minorities, many motivated by the rise of white supremacist accelerationism, a belief among some white supremacists that they must use violence to hasten the collapse of modern society so that they can build a new white supremacist civilization from its ashes. Whereas other white supremacists may or may not support violence, or only in certain circumstances or against certain targets, accelerationist white supremacists actively promote extreme violence and celebrate killers such as Timothy McVeigh, Dylann Roof, Brenton Tarrant and Patrick Crusius, among others, hoping to inspire more such perpetrators of mass killings.  

Domestic Islamist extremist attacks occurred primarily because of the rise of the terrorist group ISIS in Iraq and Syria and its repeated calls to sympathizers around the world to conduct attacks in their own regions. With the decline of ISIS in recent years, such attacks have decreased, although the threat has not disappeared. On December 31, 2022, for example, Trevor Thomas Bickford allegedly attacked three police officers working in Times Square in New York with a knife. According to law enforcement, Bickford’s attack was motivated by Islamist extremist ideology.  

The three Black nationalist incidents—two of them targeting police—all occurred in 2016-2017 in the wake of controversial high-profile police shootings of people of color. Because killings of people of color by police that are wrongful or widely perceived to be wrongful still regularly occur, future such incidents might spark additional “retaliatory” attacks.  

For the near to medium future, the main threat of extremist-related mass killings seems to be white supremacist shooters attacking targets such as people of color, Jews and Muslims and the LGBTQ+ community.
EXTREMIST MURDERS IN 2022:
THE INCIDENTS

■ Suisun City, California, December 15, 2022: Richard Raymond Klein, a validated member of the Nazi Low Riders white supremacist prison gang, allegedly shot and killed a man just one day after being released on bail months after having been arrested for a previous murder that same year (see below). Klein was apprehended in Mexico in early 2023 and returned to the U.S. The motive for this murder is not currently known.19

■ Colorado Springs, Colorado, November 19, 2022: Anderson Lee Aldrich allegedly opened fire in a shooting spree at an LGBTQ+ bar, Club Q, killing five people and wounding 17 more (while five additional people were injured while trying to escape). Following the incident, two web addresses were discovered, reportedly linked to Aldrich. One contained several very short videos that appear to have been failed attempts by Aldrich to livestream his attack. The other site was a bare-bones and mostly empty 4chan clone that included a “showcase” on its frontpage featuring an accelerationist white supremacist video titled “Wrong Target” that urged acts of terrorism and violence.20

■ Auburn, Illinois, November 8, 2022: Shane Jason Woods, facing a substantial prison sentence after being convicted for crimes committed while participating in the January 6, 2021, storming of the U.S. Capitol in Washington, D.C., allegedly deliberately drove down the wrong way of an interstate highway seeking to kill himself by crashing into a truck but instead struck a woman driving a car. The crash trapped the victim in her burning vehicle, causing fatal injuries. Woods has been charged with first degree murder, aggravated driving under the influence and aggravated fleeing.21

■ Rochester, New York, November 3, 2022: Lequan Hill, a self-declared sovereign citizen, allegedly fatally stabbed a man trying to intervene in an argument between Hill and relatives of Hill.22

■ Green Bay, Wisconsin, October 21, 2022: Joshua “Hard Rock” Scolman, an alleged white supremacist with ties to the Wisconsin Aryan Brotherhood, stabbed a black inmate to death and attempted to stab a second black inmate. Several years earlier, according to prison officials, Scolman had written about his fantasies of killing black people, torturing corrections officers who harassed him and mass murder.23
**Walled Lake, Michigan, September 11, 2022:** Igor Lanis fatally shot his wife and wounded one of his daughters in their home in southeastern Michigan. He also reportedly killed the family’s dog. Lanis subsequently died in a shootout with police. After the incident, a second daughter blamed the attack on the obsession her father had developed with QAnon, anti-vaccine and anti-5g conspiracy theories after Donald Trump lost the 2020 presidential election (this report does not, however, count this murder as an ideological murder).²⁴

**Buffalo, New York, May 14, 2022:** White supremacist Payton Gendron, in an attack clearly mimicking previous white supremacist shooting sprees in places such as Christchurch, New Zealand, and El Paso, Texas, allegedly opened fire at a supermarket in Buffalo, New York, targeting Black people. He killed 10 people and wounded three more (11 of his victims were Black). He currently faces multiple federal and state charges for his killing spree.²⁵

**Enid, Oklahoma, April 28, 2022:** Michael Scott Geiger, a member of the United Aryan Brotherhood, a white supremacist prison gang, was arrested for the murder of a two-year-old girl whom Geiger had allegedly sexually assaulted, strangled and thrown into a motel swimming pool, where the infant reportedly drowned. Geiger, who had been released from prison only a month before this incident, has been charged with first degree murder, first degree rape, kidnapping and first-degree burglary.²⁶

**Fairfield, California, April 22, 2022:** Richard Raymond Klein, a validated member of the Nazi Low Riders white supremacist prison gang, shot and killed a man in an apparent argument. Eight months later, after being released on bail, Klein would allegedly commit a second, different murder (see above).²⁷

**Tracy, California, March 15, 2022:** Jeremy Wayne Jones and Christina Lyn Garner, described by authorities as having white supremacist affiliations that include “support of Nazi, white pride, skinhead, and Aryan Brotherhood” groups, were arrested on murder and hate crime charges after allegedly shooting a Black man at a gas station. A third man, Christopher Dimenco, was charged as being an accessory. Jones was allegedly out on parole at the time of the killing, having been recently released from prison.²⁸

**Portland, Oregon, February 19, 2022:** Benjamin Jeffrey Smith allegedly opened fire at a group of left-wing protesters who had gathered near his home in Portland, Oregon, to go to a protest at a nearby park, killing one protester and wounding five more. One of the protesters was able to shoot and incapacitate Smith, halting the attack. Smith reportedly had a history of racism and antisemitism and increasing sympathy with far-right causes and positions, as well as expressions of violence against people on the political left.²⁹
■ **Tulsa, Oklahoma, January 5, 2022:** After arriving at their home in North Tulsa, Michael Johnson and his girlfriend were ambushed by a group of people, who shot and killed Johnson. According to police, the shooting occurred because Johnson ostensibly owed a drug debt to Richard Dale Deeter, Jr., a leader of the Universal Aryan Brotherhood, a large and violent Oklahoma-based white supremacist prison gang, who ordered the theft of Johnson’s vehicle to satisfy the debt. Carl Couch was arrested and charged with first-degree murder; another man was charged with accessory to murder. Couch had previously served time for manslaughter in a 2011 beating death.30

Every year there are murders that attract speculation or allegations of extremist connections. The Center on Extremism examines all such incidents for evidence of extremism. Some cases are confirmed as being extremist-connected and included in these statistics, but in many other instances, investigation either reveals no extremist ties or uncovers insufficient evidence to determine an extremist connection. Such incidents are not included in the year’s extremist murder statistics. If additional evidence is subsequently revealed for a specific murder that confirms an extremist tie, such a murder would be added to the statistics at that time.

Perhaps the most high-profile incident in 2022 not included here is the July 4, 2022, shooting spree allegedly committed by Robert Eugene Crimo III at a parade in Highland Park, Illinois, which killed seven people and wounded nearly 50 more. Although most of Crimo’s online history seemed to focus either on his attempts to promote himself as a rap artist or his macabre interests in assassinations, deaths and killings, some posts by Crimo uncovered by COE researchers and others do reveal racist and antisemitic sentiments. However, though bigoted, the postings COE has been able to observe do not clearly reveal white supremacist ideology. Moreover, most white supremacists would heavily criticize Crimo’s rap music efforts. There was also speculation that the location of Highland Park was chosen because many Jews live there, but Crimo reportedly confessed to law enforcement that he also considered shooting at a Fourth of July event in Madison, Wisconsin, so his location selections seem to have been motivated primarily by the holiday events. Ultimately, COE did not uncover sufficient evidence to confirm any extremist motivation, though it is possible more information about Crimo’s beliefs or motives may emerge as he moves through the judicial process.31

Another deadly shooting spree in 2022 occurred at the Greenwood Park Mall in Greenwood, IN, where three people were killed and two others wounded. The shooter, Jonathan Douglas Sapirman, was himself killed by an armed civilian in the mall. Investigating the deadly incident, law enforcement officers reported that Sapirman had a fascination with Nazi Germany and World War II. However, his main fixation seemed to be on mass shootings and killings. It is not uncommon for people with such ideations to have an interest in Nazi Germany, which after all perpetrated some of the most well-known mass killings in history. Authorities reported that their investigation found nothing to suggest he had antisemitic beliefs or wanted to be a Nazi, nor did they find that the attack was racially motivated. Accordingly, COE has not included this incident in its 2022 statistics.32

Finally, in August 2022, Carl Roy Webb Boards II allegedly shot and killed an Elwood, IN, police officer, Noah Shahnavaz, during a traffic stop. The subsequent police investigation of the incident revealed that Boards, who once recorded a song about killing police officers, had pamphlets in his barbershop business related to Black Hebrew Israelism, a fringe religious sect some segments of which (but not all) are extremist. A neighbor said that Boards was a BHI adherent. However, without seeing the specific contents of the pamphlets, or knowing which segment of Black Hebrew Israelism Boards may have been associated with, there is simply not enough information, as of this writing, to determine that Boards is an extremist.33

NOTES ON METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

The Center on Extremism has compiled a list of well over 1,000 known murders/killings perpetrated since 1970—essentially the post-Civil Rights era—by people associated with a variety of domestic extremist movements. These are primarily murders committed by American extremists on U.S. soil, though a few cases involving American extremists murdering other Americans abroad are also included (such as at Jonestown in Guyana). Fatalities in foreign terrorist attacks on U.S. soil, such as the December 2019 shootings at Naval Air Station Pensacola by a radicalized Saudi military aviation student, are not included.

Because extremist connections to some murders can take months or years to be revealed, statistics for the most recent years will inevitably be revised upward in future years. For example, COE’s report on extremist-related murders in 2021 counted 29 murders, but within a year, COE had uncovered four more extremist-related 2021 murders and has revised its numbers accordingly. This happens every year, so a similar upward revision is likely to occur in the future for the 2022 statistics.

The incidents are derived primarily from public sources, leading to some limitations regarding cross-era or cross-movement comparisons. Regarding cross-era comparisons, it is generally more difficult to find information on extremist-related killings from the 1970s and 1980s, so it may not be as meaningful to compare figures from earlier eras to figures from more recent decades, as figures for the earlier eras are likely to undercount deaths.

The main limitation of cross-movement comparisons is that extremist connections to killings are easier to determine for some movements than for others. For example, white supremacists, who often display many racist and white supremacist tattoos, or who may be documented as white supremacists by gang investigators or corrections officials, are often easily identifiable. In contrast, it may be more difficult for police or media to identify a suspect’s anti-government extremist associations. This issue comes up more often with non-ideological killings. It is likely that non-ideological murders committed by extremists other than white supremacists are underrepresented in ADL’s data.

In addition, because murders behind bars often attract little or no media attention and are typically not publicized by prison officials, incidents of prison-based deadly violence committed by adherents of all extremist movements are likely under-represented.

Jails and prisons pose another problem with regard specifically to adherents of the sovereign citizens movement, because those locations have become such a significant source of recruitment. Inmates behind bars for a variety of crimes—including murder—are recruited into the sovereign citizen movement by fellow inmates, who often promise prospective recruits that the movement’s pseudo-legal tactics can get them off the hook. Someone currently being tried for murder who attempts sovereign citizen arguments or tactics during legal proceedings may possibly have only been exposed to such beliefs after their arrest and may not have been a sovereign citizen at the time of the murder. Consequently, ADL does not automatically assume that someone making sovereign citizen arguments during legal proceeding was a sovereign citizen before their arrest unless there is evidence to suggest as much, or unless their sovereign arguments were made relatively soon after their arrest.

As with any such list, the inclusion or exclusion of certain borderline cases may be the result of judgment calls based on the best evidence available, judgments with which others may reasonably disagree. ADL makes the best determinations it can based on the evidence available at the time.
We need a whole-of-government approach to address the threat of domestic violent extremism. The framework that ADL has created — the PROTECT plan — is a comprehensive, seven-part plan to mitigate the threat posed by domestic extremism and domestic terrorism while protecting civil rights and civil liberties. Together, focusing on these seven categories can have an immediate and deeply significant impact in preventing and countering domestic terrorism— more so than any one action, policy, or law— and can do so while protecting civil rights and liberties and ensuring that government overreach does not harm the same vulnerable people and communities that these extremists target.
Our suggestions come under these seven areas:

**Prioritize Preventing and Countering Domestic Terrorism**

**Resource According to the Threat**

**Oppose Extremists in Government Service**

**Take Public Health and Other Domestic Terrorism Prevention Measures**

**End the Complicity of Social Media in Facilitating Extremism**

**Create an Independent Clearinghouse for Online Extremist Content**

**Target Foreign White Supremacist Terrorist Groups for Sanctions**

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**Prioritize Preventing and Countering Domestic Terrorism**

First, we urge Congress to adopt a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach to preventing and countering domestic terrorism.

- In mid-June 2021, the Biden-Harris Administration released the first-ever National Strategy to Counter Domestic Terrorism. The strategy is laudable, and a step in the right direction. However, many critical details were left unaddressed. Congress must press for further details into how the plan will be implemented, and the steps that will be taken to ensure protection for civil rights and civil liberties. Further, Departments and Agencies must create their own implementation plans for the Strategy.

- In September 2022, the White House held the United We Stand Summit to address hate-fueled violence. Bringing together impacted communities with experts on hate and extremism is a critical effort. We urge the Administration and Congress to work together to ensure that the United We Stand effort is an ongoing, fully funded, and fully supported endeavor.

- The Biden-Harris Administration recently announced the development of a National Strategy to Address Antisemitism. We applaud the announcement and look forward to the Administration and Congress working together to create a comprehensive strategy that is robustly implemented. For a full spectrum of recommendations to directly tackle antisemitism on the international, federal, and state level, see [ADL’s COMBAT Plan](#).

- The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) should create a national intelligence finding on violent threats resulting from antisemitism. Antisemitism is a common threat stream across several different violent extremist ideologies, including those typically addressed by different silos of intelligence analysis. ODNI should create a National Intelligence Assessment to determine how antisemitism can manifest as a national security threat, as well as the key threat streams that animate it and themes that will help Departments and Agencies understand the challenge.
Policies absent funding cannot be fully successful. As the President considers his annual budget – and Congress begins appropriations processes – we urge full funding for programs like the Nonprofit Security Grant Program, the Center for Prevention Programs and Partnerships, and the Homeland Security Grant Program – among others. Difficult funding decisions need to be made across all areas of public policy, but efforts to counter serious threats from domestic violent extremism must be top priorities.

The Non-Profit Security Grant Program (NSGP) provides non-profits with the capacity to increase their defense against these threats, including physical security and cybersecurity capacity and coordination. Despite recent increases in the NSGP program, as extremism threats continue to rise, the need continues to be greater than the resources provided, as outlined in previous Presidential budget requests. For the FY 2022 grants, nearly $450 million in grant applications were received for this program. At a time of increased vulnerability to threats of hate-motivated violence by domestic extremists, Congress and the Administration should significantly increase funding for non-profit religious institutions and other non-profit organizations that government and law enforcement authorities objectively determine are at high risk of attack.

In assessing the risk, the Administration should consider objective factors such as prior attacks against similarly situated institutions or organizations, and the vulnerability and financial needs of the specific institution. Officials should also consider what the criteria for “terroristic threats” are and how they should be included by NGOs when they are assessing such threats for their applications. For example, the current inclusions are relatively narrow and could potentially leave out some nuanced, yet pervasive, extremist threats that are strongly influenced by white supremacy, antisemitism, or misogyny. And finally, these programs should seek to promote equity by expanding the reach of the grant to more communities affected by security threats and experiencing other vulnerabilities.

Resource According to the Threat

We must ensure that the authorities and resources the government uses to address violent threats are proportionate to the risk of the lethality of those threats. In other words, allocation of resources must never be politicized but rather based on transparent and objective security concerns.

The previous Congress was unable to pass the bipartisan Domestic Terrorism Prevention Act (DTPA) to enhance the federal government’s efforts to prevent domestic terrorism by formally authorizing offices to address domestic terrorism and requiring law enforcement agencies to regularly report on domestic terrorist threats. Congress should reconsider the DTPA in this Congress, or at minimum, ensure that those offices are created, that they have the resources they need, and that they deploy those resources in a manner proportionate to existing threats. Further, the transparency that comes with regular reporting is crucial for civil society, Congress, and the public writ large to help oversee the national security process and hold leaders accountable. These principles can be enacted through re-introduction of the DTPA or otherwise implementing these principles through other legislative vehicles.
Congress must exercise careful oversight to ensure that no resources are expended on counterterrorism efforts targeting protected political speech or association. Investigations and other efforts to mitigate the threat should be data-driven and proportionate to the violent threat posed by violent extremist movements.

Data drives policy, and as such, Congress must empower high-quality, comprehensive data to understand threats related to hate and democracy. For example, the annual FBI hate crimes statistics demonstrate a systematic gap in reporting by law enforcement agencies. This gap must be filled, including through support for hate crimes data collection resources and requirements for mandatory reporting by law enforcement agencies.

Oppose Extremists in Government Service

It is essential that we recognize the potential for harm when extremists gain positions of power, including in government, law enforcement, and the military.

To the extent permitted by law and consistent with Constitutional protections, take steps to ensure that individuals engaged in violent extremist activity or associated with violent extremist movements, including violent white supremacist and unlawful militia movements, are deemed unsuitable for employment at the federal, state, and local levels — including in law enforcement. Appropriate steps must be taken to address any current employees, who, upon review, match these criteria.

To the extent permitted by law and consistent with Constitutional protections, take steps to ensure that individuals engaged in violent extremist activity or associated with violent extremist movements, including violent white supremacist and unlawful militia movements, are not given security clearances or other sensitive law enforcement credentials. Appropriate steps must be taken to address any current employees, who, upon review, match these criteria. Law enforcement agencies nationwide should explore options for preventing extremists from being among their ranks.

The Department of Defense (DoD) released its internal extremist threat review on December 20, 2021. This past year, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) included social media vetting authorities relevant to the domestic extremist threat. While these measures represent significant progress, the Department disbanded the working group addressing insider extremist threats, and far more must be done to find the problem within the military, train officials for how to address it, and scale efforts to fully ensure that members of our armed forces are not targeted for recruitment to extremist causes.

Similarly, DHS announced that it reviewed internal extremist threats, though noted that there were no mechanisms for doing so systematically or comprehensively. DHS and law enforcement agencies must have these protocols in place.
ADL has worked with Law Enforcement experts to provide tools for identifying and weeding out extremists in the recruitment process as well as within law enforcement ranks. While there is no evidence that white supremacist extremists have large numbers in our law enforcement agencies, we have seen that even a few can undermine the effectiveness and trust that is so essential. We have provided resources to LE agencies with guidance on approaches that do not violate First Amendment concerns.

**Take Domestic Terrorism Prevention Measures**

We must not wait until after someone has become an extremist or a terrorist attack has happened to act. Effective and promising prevention measures exist, which should be scaled.

Congress can provide funding to civil society and academic programs that have expertise in addressing recruitment to extremist causes and radicalization, whether online or offline. By providing funding for prevention activities, including education, counseling, and off-ramping, Congress can help empower public health and civil society actors to prevent and intervene in the radicalization process and undermine extremist narratives, particularly those that spread rapidly on the internet.

These initiatives must be accompanied by an assurance of careful oversight with civil rights and civil liberties safeguards. They must also meaningfully engage the communities that have been targeted by domestic terrorism and the civil society organizations already existing within them, and those communities which have been unfairly targeted when prior anti-terrorism authorities have been misused and/or abused. These initiatives must be transparent, responsive to community concerns, publicly demonstrate careful oversight, and ensure that they do not stigmatize communities. Further, DHS should not be the only agency working on prevention; ADL urges the Department to partner with Health and Human Services and other non-security Departments whenever possible.

While Congress has funded a small grant program for prevention measures domestically, the program is too small to have an impact at scale. Congress should significantly scale the Center for Prevention Programming and Partnerships within DHS, such as through $200 million per year in grants and a proportionate increase in program evaluations, the results of which should be published for public view.

DHS should be empowered to support research and innovation to address domestic violent extremism. However, there have been reports that research and innovation related to domestic violent extremist radicalization has been halted at DHS, which would be troubling; we urge the Committee to review such press reporting and ensure adequate implementation of research and innovation.
End the Complicity of Social Media in Facilitating Extremism

Congress must prioritize countering online extremism and ensuring that perpetrators who engage in unlawful activity online can be held accountable. Online platforms often lack adequate policies to mitigate extremism and hate equitably and at scale. Federal and state laws and policies require significant updating to hold online platforms and individual perpetrators accountable for enabling hate, racism, and extremist violence across the internet. In March 2021, ADL announced the REPAIR Plan, which offers a comprehensive framework for platforms and policymakers to take meaningful action to decrease online hate and extremism. Like ADL’s PROTECT Plan, REPAIR addresses on domestic extremism and terrorism but goes beyond these issues to address other manifestations and harms of online hate, including online harassment, antisemitism, racism, and disinformation.

Create an Independent Clearinghouse for Online Extremist Content

Congress should work with the Biden-Harris Administration to create a publicly funded, independent nonprofit center to track online extremist threat information in real-time and make referrals to social media companies and law enforcement agencies when appropriate.

- This approach is needed because those empowered with law enforcement and intelligence capabilities must not be tasked with new investigative and other powers that could infringe upon civil liberties – for example, through broad internet surveillance. Scouring online sources through an independent organization will act as a buffer, but will not prevent the nonprofit center from assisting law enforcement in cases where criminal behavior is suspected. This wall of separation, modeled in part on the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), will help streamline national security tips and resources while preserving civil liberties.

- In FY2022 appropriations, the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) was provided with $500,000 to investigate the feasibility of this concept. NIJ should be empowered to complete its review, and Congress should quickly follow up to ensure that a clearinghouse can be authorized.

Target Foreign White Supremacist Terrorist Groups

Congress must recognize that white supremacist extremism is a major global threat of our era and mobilize with that mindset.

- To date, no white supremacist organization operating overseas has been designated as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Only one – and some members of its leadership – has been designated as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). Congress should review how these designation decisions are made, whether any additional racially or ethnically motivated extremist groups outside the United States, particularly white supremacist groups, have reached the threshold for either designation, and whether such designations would help advance U.S. national interests.
The Department of State was required by the FY2021 NDAA to develop a strategy to counter global white supremacist extremism and to add white supremacist terrorism to annual Country Reports on Terrorism. That State has implemented the Country Reports guidance is laudable, and State may have created the strategy in question. However, the strategy has not been released publicly, making it impossible to evaluate. We urge more transparency from State in this process and for Congress to seek accountability for any gaps in the strategy, and to provide resources to implement it.

The Department of State must mobilize a multilateral effort to address the threat of white supremacy globally. Multilateral best-practice institutions, such as the Global Counterterrorism Forum, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, and the International Institute for Justice and Rule of Law, may be helpful mechanisms through which to channel some efforts. Moreover, the Global Engagement Center should be charged with undermining the propaganda of violent extremist groups – not just designated terrorist organizations, but overseas white supremacist violent extremists as well. DHS should participate in these efforts, supporting overseas exchanges, partnerships, and best practices sharing to engage in learning from other countries and sharing U.S. best practices, where applicable.
ENDNOTES


2 The H.E.A.T. map—which allows configurable searches of many different kinds—can be accessed at https://www.adl.org/resources/tools-to-track-hate/heat-map.


9 Ibid.


27 Bammer, "East Bay man faces arraignment."


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Vice President, Center on Extremism

Mark Pitcavage, Senior Research Fellow at ADL Center on Extremism (COE), is a longstanding expert on domestic extremism and terrorism, with particular expertise on right-wing extremism in the United States, a subject on which he has written extensively. He has a Ph.D. in military history from The Ohio State University and previously served as Director of the COE.
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