

Meeting Date: April 25, 2023

From: MOA Elections Team

Subject: Risk Limiting Audit for the April 4, 2023 Regular Municipal Election

I. <u>Executive Summary</u>

The MOA Elections Team conducted a post-election audit that contained three areas of focus.

- 1. *Hand-Count.* A pre-determined percentage of ballots in randomly specified contests was selected and the actual random ballots for those specified races were hand counted.
- 2. *Machine Review.* Cast Vote Records were produced from the tabulation system and tallied for the ballots selected.
- 3. **Comparison of Hand-Count and Machine Review.** The totals from the hand-count, detailed in paragraph 1, and the totals from the machine count, detailed in paragraph 2, were compared.

The results of the MOA post-election Risk Limiting Audit are that the scanning, adjudication, and tabulation system performed as expected and the results reflect the will of the voters. All ballots were adjudicated and tabulated as expected. The results of the hand-count and the machine tabulation were identical.¹

II. WHAT IS A POST-ELECTION RISK LIMITING AUDIT?

A. Research. Research defines a post-election audit as a check to confirm that the voting equipment and procedures used to count votes worked properly. Post-election audits are recommended by election security experts as one method of protecting the integrity of elections.

There are many types of "post-election audits" used to validate election results or outcomes. As a term of art, it refers to checking paper ballots (or records) against the results produced by the vote tallying equipment to ensure accuracy.

Risk limiting audits (RLA) use statistically developed audit techniques that allow selection of a number of ballots to be audited that provide statistical confidence that the tabulation system performed as expected. A RLA is an incremental audit system: If the percentage of risk selected in advance of the audit failed to demonstrate the tabulation system was

¹ For more detailed information on the results of the audit, see Item G. Comparison of the Hand-Count to the Machine Count, Results of the Risk Limiting Audit, and Exhibit A - RLA Worksheet

performing as expected, election officials would review further ballots or conduct a full manual tally of the election.

The MOA Election Team conducts "Batch-Level Comparison Audits," which is a type of RLA that most resembles a "traditional" audit. In a batch-level comparison audit, the voting system must export identifiable physical batches of ballots. In the MOA RLA, Election Officials physically selected random batches from the entire election to audit. In "Batch-Level Comparison Audits" and in the MOA RLA, Election Officials add up the selected batch-level results by hand to verify that they produce the reported contest outcomes. The votes in each selected batch were examined manually and hand-counted, and the audit counts were compared to the tabulation system's report and subtotals. Depending on the number and type of discrepancies the audit finds in the sample, the audit either stops or examines more batches manually.

B. Implementation of the Risk Limiting Audit at the MOA

Successful implementation of any new election process requires careful thought and a considerable amount of planning. The MOA Elections Team began looking at postelection audits in 2020. One important step in preparing for the post-election audit, was obtaining the imprinters on the ballot scanners in 2020; the imprinters put a unique number – the scanner, batch, and ballot number – on each ballot, allowing elections officials the ability to pull the actual ballot to confirm the votes.

The MOA Elections Team conducted a practice audit after the 2021 Regular Municipal election in preparation for implementation of post-election audit in 2022. The practice was worthwhile: The Elections Team determined it tested too many ballots in one race and too few in another; the Elections Team pulled individual ballots which was incredibly time consuming. To address this shortcoming, the 2022 audits tested "batches" of ballots, which was more efficient to select and re-file rather than randomly selecting individual ballots and having to refile those.

Now, the Elections Team is happy to provide the results of the Risk Limiting Audit at certification.

III. PROCEDURES FOR THE RISK LIMITING AUDIT

A. Selection of Races and Measure to be audited.

1. Selection of Race and Measure. The MOA Risk Limiting Audit Procedures requires the Elections Team to identify the races and measures to be audited by rolling a 6-sided die. In years where there is no Mayor's race, the MOA Elections Team is to randomly select one Assembly race and one proposition to audit. The Elections Team first rolled the 6-sided die and the result was a 1, therefore the Assembly District 1 race was randomly selected to be audited. The Elections Team rolled the die again and the result was a 6. Since Proposition 6 was not an area-wide proposition, the die was rolled again, and

the result was a 4. Proposition 4 was an area-wide race therefore, Proposition 4 was also randomly selected to be audited.

Target Number of Ballots. The target number of ballots per race or measure was calculated. 5% of the ballots cast in the proposition, or 3,200, were selected for the audit. 3% of the total ballots cast in the race, or 176, were selected for the audit.

The exact calculations for target number of ballots are as follows:

- Calculate 5% of ballots cast in the in the Proposition selected, regardless of the number of votes cast or spread. Round down to nearest 1,000. E.g., change 64,724 to 64,000 for ease of count:
 - In 2023, total ballots cast = 64,000 x .05 = 3,200
- Calculate 3% of total votes cast in the Assembly race:
 - In District 3, total votes cast (note, this is different that total ballots cast used for areawide races) = 5,864 x .03 = 176

The audit actually reviewed 3,227 ballots in the areawide measure and 200in the district-wide race because we count entire batches.

3. Random Selection of Batches. To reach the 3,200 ballots targeted for review in the Municipal-wide Proposition 4 ballot measure, the MOA Elections Team estimated a minimum of 320 batches would be required to be audited since during the processing of the election, approximately 100 ballots were scanned per batch. (3,200/100 = 32; we realized later the mental math error we made.) Because the ballot was a two-card ballot, the Team selected 660 batches for this audit – in the event that some of the batches could contain less than the 100 ballots typically scanned per batch.

Then, staff calculated the percentage of total ballots processed in the election on ICC 1 (scanner 1), ICC 2 (scanner 2), and ICC 3 (scanner 3) The result is that 310 batches from ICC1, 205 batches from ICC2 and 145 batches from ICC3 would be pulled for audit.

The exact calculations for the number of batches selected from each scanner are as follows:

- 1. Determine the total number of batches scanned by each selected ICC:
 - <u>ICC 1= 913 batches</u>
 - <u>ICC 2 = 611 batches</u>
 - <u>ICC 3 = 433 batches</u>
 - <u>1,957 total batches to possibly be verified</u>

- 2. Determine the percentage of total batches each ICC scanned:
 - <u>ICC 1 = 913/1,957 = 47%</u>
 - <u>ICC 2 = 611/1,957 = 31%</u>
 - <u>ICC 3 = 433/1,957 = 22%</u>
- For each ICC selected, use the percentage of total batches each ICC scanned to determine the random number of batches needed from each ICC, and then to determine which batch numbers for each ICC to pull. Since 30 batches were selected for verification, the total number of batches for verification from each ICC is as follows:
 - ICC 1 = 47% of total batches x 660 batches for verification = 310
 - ICC 2 = 31% of total batches x 660 batches for verification = 205
 - ICC 3 = 22% of total batches x 660 batches for verification = 145

B. Use Pseudo-Random Number Generator for Random Selection of Batches.

The staff then used the Pseudo-Random Number generator at <u>https://www.stat.berkeley.edu/~stark/Java/Html/sha256Rand.htm</u> to randomly select the batches of ballots from each ICC. Following the instructions on the Pseudo-Random Number Generator, the selected were as follows:

(1) Roll the ten, ten-sided dice one time, and then a second time and input all twenty numbers into the "Seed". "Seed," is the starting point of a random number generator.



(2) Enter the "Seed" and other information into the random number generator and press "Draw Sample." The result is the list of randomly selected items.

ICC-1 Summary in Word (cut + pasted from Items Selected: Random # Generator

452,899,396,546,701,835,292,564,776,681,424,376,674,633,645,618,790,132,128,54,44,87,72,908,146,710,338,253,9,8 11,682,559,637,223,361,85,103,902,170,517,109,713,313,80,195,635,597,244,300,867,479,855,226,472,591,350,512,20 8,840,73,524,187,551,22,507,76,7,148,639,799,77,408,897,513,589,847,624,251,826,312,194,410,895,785,861,147,896, 410,700,495,433,531,135,562,683,83,841,328,226,256,204,111,725,119,800,609,806,262,778,765,563,811,887,86,638,5 10,883,270,175,16,566,901,808,385,392,640,766,358,107,377,367,162,189,621,881,279,892,329,750,512,270,220,665,1 04,151,198,892,527,675,524,265,785,285,376,633,113,352,499,842,731,73,7,166,722,890,524,816,143,159,278,365,699 ,507,336,589,204,723,700,449,860,326,480,644,533,613,161,725,59,192,853,510,564,185,699,368,371,837,642,703,523 ,50,250,136,761,374,388,607,883,626,211,202,873,426,115,414,817,390,736,402,204,202,126,532,155,59,238,791,370, 475,519,423,402,845,321,419,38,155,374,709,895,522,590,885,795,330,356,382,311,834,550,856,180,637,606,697,184, 235,304,90,878,285,257,414,33,344,239,867,173,384,813,873,410,532,835,100,217,436,356,151,502,616,762,273,21,58 2,430,607,151,742,906,718,838,453,688,172,675,888,329,430,309,337,243,621,186,893,126,787,164,138,482,308

The process was repeated for ICC 2:

TLC-Z

Pseudo-Random Number Generator using SHA-256

Input a random seed with at least 20 digits (generated by rolling a 10-sided die, for instance), the number of objects from which you want a sample, and the number of objects you want in the sample.

-Pseudo-Random Sample Using SHA-	-256	
Seed: 0,2,7,1,9,2,7,1,0,8,5,8,6,5,6,8,8,8,4,0)	
Number of objects from which to same	ple: 611	
Current sample number: 205	Draw this many objects: 205	draw sample
reset		
Hashed value (for testing):		
59dd158b1fe7eace01cb3563b2142493da9d	99737d08f4c40b09bd42fd1be6fe	
Randomly selected item: 378		
Items selected:		
70,313,97,200,267,596,414,246,95,92, 52,428,326,409,273,111,372,113,159,8 ,28,470,216,417,90,94,162,99,343,135 454,412,137,303,470,91,489,441,448,2 3,176,210,33,216,122,516,323,460,248 70,75,249,271,253,54,380,466,431,47, 5,368,408,579,183,491,189,136,508,13 76,232,71,505,285,148,36,282,261,269 6,401,191,81,209,457,140,56,446,176, 192,305,18,428,601,219,91,227,83,343	574,63,274,267,123,313,74,17,370,233 16,31,155,142,472,337,399,481,540,93, 5,269,107,352,250,363,7,106,342,337,5 191,467,209,437,203,194,146,160,70,12 8,394,494,592,206,210,600,267,356,186 384,588,370,463,263,461,352,386,419, 17,452,232,279,362,356,284,414,603,24 0,524,100,98,509,454,578,585,144,337, 211,459,100,265,11,161,240,482,509,3 5,503,171,378	3,441,577,5 ,31,440,275 519,591,66, 24,416,336, 5,607,455,4 ,536,428,59 4,233,110,2 ,367,572,19 354,170,60,

The process was repeated for ICC 3:

I((-3

Pseudo-Random Number Generator using SHA-256

Input a random seed with at least 20 digits (generated by rolling a 10-sided die, for instance), the number of objects from which you want a sample, and the number of objects you want in the sample.

–Pseudo-Random Sample Using SI	HA-256	
Seed: 1,6,3,6,6,2,8,3,8,3,0,4,3,7,5,7,1,7	,9,1	
Number of objects from which to sa	ample: 433	
Current sample number: 145 reset Hashed value (for testing):	Draw this many objects: 145	draw sample
aebae77264a16a3cfde1ab6a7e9f1e0db6	31a18062d10acdbc19a55a1cc0d3daf	
Randomly selected item: 432		
Items selected:		
374,284,125,278,30,25,417,107,113 91,306,14,286,237,50,143,214,261, ,130,164,112,174,419,300,276,34,1 ,53,43,399,163,296,103,309,90,51, 377,79,215,22,57,35,118,409,185,1 25,50,419,224,94,366,155,333,359, 09,154,304,173,87,52,212,307,149,	,209,7,50,322,277,328,387,76,35,245,361 374,406,97,153,120,188,267,432,372,387, ,348,339,59,390,353,261,39,256,40,116,3 58,81,355,193,111,218,180,219,251,290,5 54,81,115,122,364,188,295,277,423,150,2 57,202,425,53,103,232,113,175,34,234,32 398,332,364,36,432	1,156,182,1 ,250,228,15 387,164,222 96,235,284, 207,22,380, 24,15,161,3

The batches were pulled and delivered to counting teams.

C. Hand-Count Results

Assembly District 1 – Only the top two candidates in the batches were handcounted. The ballots were sorted by Candidate A, Candidate B, and other. The results of the hand-count are as follows:

Category	Hand-Count
Candidate 1	147
Candidate 2	53
Total	200

Proposition 4 – The ballots were sorted by Yes, No, and other. The results of the hand-count are as follows:

Category	Hand-Count
Yes	2,015
Νο	1,212
Total	3,227

Machine Count Verification

After the batches of ballots were hand-counted, the Cast Vote Records for the selected batches of ballots were produced and tallied. The batch totals were transferred to the RLA Worksheet² and are as follows:

Assembly District 1

Category	Machine-
	Count Total
Candidate 1	147
Candidate 2	53
Total	200

Proposition 4

Category	Machine- Count Total
Yes	2,015
No	1,212
Total	3,227

Comparison of the Hand-Count to the Machine Count

The third and final step in the post-election audit was to compare the hand-count to the machine count. The comparison is as follows:

Assembly District 1

Category	Hand- Count	Machine- Count Total		
Candidate 1	147	147		
Candidate 2	53	53		
Total	200	200		

Proposition X

Category	Hand- Count	Machine- Count Total
Yes	2,015	2,015
No	1,212	1,212
Total	3,227	3,227

² See Exhibit A – RLA Worksheet

The result of the post-election audit are that of 3,200 randomly selected ballots, the hand count and machine count of those ballots was identical. The conclusion is that the scanning, adjudication, and tabulation system performed as expected and the results of the election demonstrated the will of the voters.

Respectfully Submitted: MOA Elections Team Jamie Heinz, Election Administrator Barbara A. Jones, Municipal Clerk

Exhibit A

	Handcount	Handcount	Machine Batch	Machine Batch Level				Machine Batch	Machine Batch	
Scanner &	Column A	Column B	Level Results			Handcount Column D	Handcount Column E	Level Results	Level Results	
Batch #	Yes	No N=3200		Prop No	Proposition	Candidate 1	Candidate 2 n=176	Candidate 1	Candidate 2	Касе
1-452	29	20	29	20		0	0	0	0	
1-899	34	13	34	13		0	0	0	0	
1-396	31	19	31	19		1	0	1	0	
1-546	22	26	22	26		0	0	0	0	
1-701	21	27	21	27		0	0	0	0	
1-835	1	0	1	0		0	0	0	0	
1-292	13	4	13	4		5	0	5	0	
1-564	13	10	13	10		0	0	0	0	
1-776	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	
1-681	20	11	20	11		3	1	3	1	
1-424	41	9	41	9		0	0	0	0	
1-376	35	14	35	14		0	0	0	0	
1-674	33	17	33	17		25	15	25	15	
1-633	27	16	27	16		0	0	0	0	
1-645	18	19	18	19		0	0	0	0	
1-618	30	21	30	21		0	0	0	0	
1-790	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	
1-132	34	9	34	9		0	0	0	0	
1-128	28	21	28	21		0	0	0	0	
1-54	3	5	3	5		0	0	0	0	
1-44	18	8	18	8		0	0	0	0	
1-87	18	6	18	6		0	0	0	0	
1-72	16	9	16	9		0	0	0	0	
1-908	30	9	30	9		6	4	6	4	
1-146	19	9	19	9		0	0	0	0	
1-710	11	12	11	12		0	0	0	0	
1-338	39	10	39	10		21	1	21	1	
1-253	29	20	29	20		0	0	0	0	
1-9	19	6	19	6		0	0	0	0	
1-811	0	0	0	0		0	0	0	0	
1-682	28	13	28	13		0	0	0	0	
1-559	25	24	25	24		0	0	0	0	
1-637	26	21	26	21		0	0	0	0	
1-223	28	6	28	6						
1-361	34	16	34	16						
1-85	18	6	18	6						
1-103	23	27	23	27						
2-70	26	17	26	17		1	3	1	3	
2-313	18	20	18	20		0	0	0	0	
2-97	13	12	13	12		0	0	0	0	
2-200	6	1	6	1		6	1	6	1	
2-267	21	20	21	20		0	0	0	0	
2-596	30	20	30	20		0	0	0	0	
2-414	17	14	17	14		0	1	0	1	
2-246	26	15	26	15		0	0	0	0	
2-95	3	0	3	0		0	0	0	0	
2-92	26	9	26	9		0	0	0	0	
2-574	29	25	29	25		0	0	0	0	
2-63	21	19	21	19		0	0	0	0	
2-2/4	36	16	36	16		5	1	5	1	
2-123	15	8	15	8		7	1	7	1	
2-74	20	5	20	5		11	1	11	1	

Exhibit A

	Handcount	Handcount	Machine Batch	Machine Batch Level					Machine Batch	Machine Batch	
Scanner &	Column A	Column B	Level Results		lotal	Handcount Column D	Handcount Column E		Level Results	Level Results	lotal
Batch #	Yes	No N=3200	Prop Yes	Prop No	Proposition	Candidate 1	Candidate 2	า=176	Candidate 1	Candidate 2	Race
2-17	13	12	13	12		0	0		0	0	
2-370	16	22	16	22		0	0		0	0	
2-233	28	11	28	11		0	0		0	0	
2-441	16	8	16	8		0	0		0	0	
2-577	23	27	23	27		0	0		0	0	
2-428	13	10	13	10		0	0		0	0	
2-326	26	13	26	10		5	0		5	0	
2.320	19	10	19	10		3	0		0	0	
2-403	27	11	10	13		2	2		2	2	
2-275	27		2/			2			2	3	
2-111	20	11	11	11		10	U		10	0	
2-372	39	11	39	11		16	1		16	/	
2-113	14	10	14	10							
2-159	14	6	14	6							
2-86	35	10	35	10							
3-374	29	17	29	17		0	0		0	0	
3-284	12	7	12	7		0	2		0	2	
3-125	18	14	18	14		0	0		0	0	
3-278	22	12	22	12		0	0		0	0	
3-30	20	5	20	5		0	0		0	0	
3-25	17	8	17	8		0	0		0	0	
3-417	23	25	23	25		0	0		0	0	
3-107	16	8	16	8		15	4		15	4	
3-113	21	11	21	11		0	0		0	0	
3-209	13	12	13	12		0	0		0	0	
3-7	17	8	17	8		0	0		0	0	
3-50	0	2	0	2		0	0		0	0	
3-322	21	29	21	29		0	0		0	0	
3-277	22	16	22	16		0	0		0	0	
3-328	39	11	39	11		0	0		0	0	
3-387	45	9	45	9		2	1		2	1	
3-76	16	2	16	2		1	2		1	2	
3-35	17	12	17	12		0	0		0	0	
3-245	26	25	26	25		0	1		0	1	
3-361	14	9	14	9		0	0		0	0	
3-156	10	13	10	13		0	0		0	0	
3-182	13	11	13	11		0	0		0	0	
3-191	15	8	15	8		0	0		0	0	
3-306	24	25	24	0 25		0	0		0	0	
2.14	24		19	23		0	0		0	0	
2 296	18	2	18	5		0	0		0	0	
3-286	27	22	2/			0	0		0	0	
3-237	18	5	18	5		11	4		11	4	
3-143	6	4	6	4		4	0		4	0	
3-214	16	9	16	9		0	0		0	0	
3-261	14	10	14	10							
3-406	31	17	31	17							
	2015	1212 3	227 2015	1212	3227	147	53	200	147	53	200